Pilot contamination for active eavesdropping by Maham, Behrouz et al.
1Pilot Contamination for Active Eavesdropping
Xiangyun Zhou, Member, IEEE, Behrouz Maham, Member, IEEE, and Are Hjørungnes
Abstract—Existing studies on physical layer security often
assume the availability of perfect channel state information (CSI)
and overlook the importance of channel training needed for
obtaining the CSI. In this letter, we discuss how an active eaves-
dropper can attack the training phase in wireless communication
to improve its eavesdropping performance. We derive a new
security attack from the pilot contamination phenomenon, which
targets at systems using reverse training to obtain the CSI at the
transmitter for precoder design. This attack changes the precoder
used by the legitimate transmitter in a controlled manner to
strengthen the signal reception at the eavesdropper during data
transmission. Furthermore, we discuss an efficient use of the
transmission energy of an advanced full-duplex eavesdropper to
simultaneously achieve a satisfactory eavesdropping performance
whilst degrading the detection performance of the legitimate
receiver.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, active eavesdropper,
channel estimation, pilot contamination.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a significant effort has been made on physi-
cal layer security to prevent message eavesdropping by a
malicious user. Many studies have taken an information-
theoretic approach to compute the achievable rate with perfect
secrecy [1]. However, the channel knowledge assumptions
and coding complexity needed for achieving perfect secrecy
may not always be possible. Departing from the information-
theoretic framework, the studies on physical layer security en-
hancements have also been carried out from a signal process-
ing perspective oriented towards more practical designs. For
example, the precoding design of multi-antenna transmission
was considered in [2–4] to weaken the signal reception at the
eavesdropper or lower the probability of interception.
While various secure transmission schemes are under rapid
development, increasingly powerful adversaries also bring in
new security attacks. One important example is an active
eavesdropper, which acts as either (both) a jammer or (and)
a classical eavesdropper in a half-duplex (full-duplex) mode.
The decision between jamming and eavesdropping for a half-
duplex eavesdropper was studied in [5, 6]. A quasi full-duplex
case was considered in [7] where a multi-antenna eavesdropper
partitioned its antenna array into eavesdropping and jamming
sub-arrays. In this work, we look for new designs of an active
eavesdropper from a practical viewpoint.
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One major assumption in the literature of physical layer
security is the perfect knowledge of the legitimate user’s
channel state information (CSI). While a few exceptions can be
found in [8–10] which incorporated channel uncertainty in the
secure transmission design, they did not consider the training
phase needed for obtaining the (imperfect) CSI. In this letter,
we show that the inclusion of the training phase in practical
communication systems creates an exciting opportunity for
the eavesdropper to develop smart attacks. Specifically, we
derive a new security attack based on the pilot contamination
phenomenon. Pilot contamination was first discussed in [11]
in multi-cell systems (without security considerations), where
simultaneous uplink training with correlated pilot signals in
different cells causes undesirable correlation between the
precoding vectors designed at the base stations in those cells.
In this work, we show that this undesirable phenomenon can
indeed be utilized by an active eavesdropper to improve its
eavesdropping performance.
The pilot contamination attack targets at systems in which
the transmitter designs its precoder based on the estimates
of the legitimate link’s CSI and the estimation is done by
having the receiver send pilot signals to facilitate the channel
estimation at the transmitter, i.e., reverse training. The reverse
training scheme requires channel reciprocity which holds
in time-division duplex (TDD) systems [11, 12]. During the
reverse training phase, the active eavesdropper also sends the
same pilot signals to fool the transmitter about the correct
channel to be estimated. As a result, the transmitter incorrectly
designs the precoder which will benefit the signal reception
at the eavesdropper during data transmission. Compared with
the active eavesdropper designs in [5–7] where the transmitted
signal from the eavesdropper is random jamming noise with
the purpose of degrading the signal reception at the legitimate
receiver, the pilot contamination attack transmits deterministic
signals with the purpose of improving the signal reception at
the eavesdropper.
Notation: Boldface letters denote vectors. [] and []T
denote complex conjugate and transpose, respectively. k  k
denotes the Euclidean norm. Efg is the expectation operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider message transmissions from a legitimate trans-
mitter, Alice, to an intended receiver, Bob, in the presence
of an eavesdropper, Eve. We assume that channel reciprocity
holds. Alice is equipped with NA antennas where NA > 1,
while both Bob and Eve have a single antenna (for transmis-
sion or reception), i.e.,NB = NE = 1. The wireless channels
between the three communicating terminals experience large-
scale path loss as well as small-scale fading. The channel
parameters are shown in Fig. 1. For instance, the channel
2Fig. 1. The parameters of the wireless communication channels between
Alice (A), Bob (B), and Eve (E). Alice is equipped with multiple antennas,
while both Bob and Eve have a single antenna for transmission or reception.
from Alice to Bob is modeled as
p
ABhAB , where AB
denotes the path loss attenuation and hAB is the fading gain.
The channel from Bob to Alice is denoted as
p
BAhBA,
where hBA = hTAB due to channel reciprocity and BA is not
necessarily equal to AB . Similarly, we denote the channels
from Alice to Eve and from Eve to Alice as
p
AEhAE andp
EAhEA, respectively, and the channel from Eve to Bob asp
EBhEB , where hEB is a scalar. Note that hEA = hTAE
due to channel reciprocity. The channel gains hAB and hAE
are 1  NA row vectors, while hBA and hEA are NA  1
column vectors. We model the entries in all channel gains
as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean
complex Gaussian random variables with unit variance. We
also assume that the path loss attenuations are constant and
known to all terminals. Nevertheless, the channel fading gains
are unknown to all terminals at the start of the communication.
A. Secure Transmission versus Classical Eavesdropping
We consider block-wise transmissions in which the channel
fading gains are assumed to be constant during one transmis-
sion block of L symbols and change to some independent
values in the next block. For a message transmission from
Alice, the received signal at Bob, ignoring possible jamming
noise from Eve, is given by
yB =
p
PAABhABwxd + nB ; (1)
where xd is the normalized message symbol with unit vari-
ance, PA denotes the power of the message symbol, w is the
NA1 beamforming vector, and nB is the zero-mean complex
Gaussian receiver noise at Bob with variance 2B . Similarly,
the received signal at Eve is given by
yE =
p
PAAEhAEwxd + nE ; (2)
where nE is the zero-mean complex Gaussian receiver noise
at Eve with variance 2E .
From the legitimate user’s viewpoint, the goal is to provide
reliable communication between Alice and Bob, at the same
time preventing message eavesdropping by Eve. From (2),
we see that the effective channel fading gain for Eve is
given by hAEw, which is unknown to Eve. However, Eve
can rely on blind detection techniques if hAEw is fixed
over a sufficiently long period of time. This is true for the
conventional beamforming transmission where a fixed w is
used and hence, hAEw is fixed over the entire transmission
block. To overcome this problem, the authors in [4] proposed
a randomized beamforming design. This design requires the
knowledge of hAB to be obtained at Alice but completely
unknown to Eve. This can be realized using reverse training,
i.e., having Bob send pilot signals to allow the channel esti-
mation at Alice. Denote the estimate of hAB as h^AB . Alice
randomly generates w for each data symbol transmission with
only one constraint given by h^ABw = kh^ABk. The received
signal at Bob can then be rewritten as
yB =
p
PAABkh^ABkxd +
p
PAAB ~hABwxd + nB ; (3)
where ~hAB = hAB   h^AB denotes the channel estimation
error. Note that the second term in (3) is generally non-
Gaussian and is uncorrelated with the first term in (3) if
the linear minimum mean square error (LMMSE) criterion
is used for channel estimation. The detection of xd is pos-
sible since the coefficient in the first term of (3) takes a
constant positive value over the current transmission block,
i.e.,
pPAABkh^ABk, even if h^AB is unknown to Bob. On
the other hand, the effective channel fading gain for Eve,
hAEw, is random for each symbol transmission. As the results
shown in [4], Eve cannot do any better than a guessing-based
exhaustive search for data detection and her bit error rate
(BER) stays around 0.5.
With the randomized beamforming design in [4], it seems
hopeless for Eve to intercept the message anymore. However,
our discussion has overlooked the importance of the reverse
training phase. In the remainder of this letter, we show how
an active eavesdropper can increase its chance of message
eavesdropping by attacking the reverse training phase in a
controlled manner.
III. THE PILOT CONTAMINATION ATTACK
In this section, we describe the pilot contamination attack,
which is available when the reverse training sequence used
by Alice and Bob is also known by Eve. Since the training
sequence is fixed and repeatedly used over time, it can be
easily obtained by Eve. This creates an opportunity for an ac-
tive eavesdropper to make a controlled impact on the channel
estimation at Alice. Specifically, Eve transmits the pilots at
the same time as Bob transmits during the reverse training
phase. This makes Alice’s estimate of her outgoing channel
to Bob also align with her outgoing channel to Eve. The
impact of the pilot contamination attack is twofold: it reduces
the accuracy of Alice’s estimate of her outgoing channel to
Bob; and more importantly it helps the data detection at Eve
by infecting the beamforming design at Alice. Note that an
important assumption made here is the synchronization of
transmissions from Bob and Eve. In order to synchronize with
Bob, Eve needs to estimate the propagation delays between all
the terminals using their location information and obtain any
timing information by utilizing the signal exchange between
3Alice and Bob during the transmitter-receiver synchronization.
The details on when and how accurate synchronization is
achievable are beyond the scope of this work.
For block-wise transmissions, each block of L symbols
consists of a reverse training phase and a data transmission
phase. We assume that only one pilot symbol is transmitted,
followed by L  1 data symbol transmissions. The extension
to multiple pilot symbols is straightforward. In what follows,
we discuss the training and data transmission in detail. We
consider that Eve operates in a full-duplex mode, so that she
can also transmit jamming signal to Bob whilst listening to
the data transmission from Alice. For simplicity, we assume
no self-interference between the transmit and receive antenna
at Eve.1 As discussed later, the half-duplex mode is a special
case of the full-duplex mode.
Reverse Training Phase: During the reverse training phase,
both Bob and Eve transmit the pilot and the received signal
at Alice is given by
yA =
p
PBBAhBAxp +
pPEpEAhEAxp + nA; (4)
where xp is the normalized pilot symbol with unit variance,
nA is the receiver noise vector at Alice having zero-mean
complex Gaussian entries with variance 2A. In addition, PB
denotes the training power at Bob and PEp denotes the pilot
contamination power at Eve. Assuming Alice knows Bob’s
training power and has accurately obtained the variance of
the received signal yA, she applies the LMMSE method to
estimate hAB , given by [13]
h^AB = h^
T
BA
=
p
PBBAxp(PBBA + PEpEA + 2A) 1yTA; (5)
which is also directly related to the LMMSE estimate of hAE
as
h^AE =
s
PEpEA
PBBA h^AB : (6)
Beamforming Design: Treating h^AB as the true channel
gain, Alice designs the beamforming vector w for data
transmission. For both the conventional beamforming and the
randomized beamforming described in Section II-A, we have
h^ABw = kh^ABk. One major difference between the two
beamforming designs is the long-term average power of w
defined as 2w = Efkwk2g: 2w = 1 for the conventional
beamforming and 2w > 1 for the randomized beamform-
ing [4].
Data Transmission Phase: During the data transmission
phase, Alice transmits L   1 data symbols while both Bob
and Eve perform detection. In addition, Eve also transmits
jamming signals to degrade Bob’s detection performance. For
simplicity, we consider binary phase shift keying (BPSK)
1As we will describe, Eve transmits pilot signals during the reverse
training phase. This allows her to measure the wireless channel gain between
the transmit and receive antenna. Hence, the self-interference in the data
transmission phase is known by Eve in principle. Any unknown residual self-
interference due to other practical imperfections is beyond the scope of this
work.
modulation, hence xd = 1. For each symbol transmission,
the received signal at Bob is given by
yB =
p
PAABhABwxd +
p
PEdEBhEBv + nB ;
=
p
PAABkh^ABkxd +
p
PAAB ~hABwxd
+
p
PEdEBhEBv + nB ; (7)
where v denotes the jamming noise symbol with unit variance
and PEd denotes the jamming power. We assume that the
jamming noise has the same distribution as the receiver noise.
As mentioned earlier, the second term in (7) is non-Gaussian
and uncorrelated with the first term.
Although kh^ABk is unknown to Bob, the detection of the
BPSK modulated symbol xd can be easily done by observing
the sign of the real part of yB , i.e.,RfyBg. Hence, the
average error performance is closely related to the average
post-processing SNR given by
SNRB =
2PAABEfkh^ABk2g
PAABEfk~hABwk2g+ PEdEB + 2B
: (8)
Using some basic properties of the LMMSE estimator and
the fact that hAB has Gaussian entries with unit variance,
the expectations Efkh^ABk2g and Efk~hABwk2g can be easily
computed (derivations omitted for brevity), and SNRB can
then be further expressed as in (11) at the top of the next
page.
At the same time, the received signal at Eve is given by (2)
and can be rewritten as
yE =
p
PAAEh^AEwxd +
p
PAAE ~hAEwxd + nE ;
=
p
PAAE
s
PEpEA
PBBA kh^ABkxd
+
p
PAAE ~hAEwxd + nE ; (9)
where we have defined ~hAE = hAE   h^AE and used (6) to
express h^AE in terms of h^AB . We see that the coefficient
of xd in the first term of (9) takes a constant positive value
over the entire transmission block, even if the randomized
beamforming scheme is used by Alice. In other words, pilot
contamination has made randomized beamforming ineffective.
Similar to Bob, the detection at Eve is done by observing the
sign of RfyEg. The average post-processing SNR at Eve is
given by
SNRE =
2PAAE PEpEAPBBA Efkh^ABk2g
PAAEEfk~hAEwk2g+ 2E
: (10)
By evaluating the expectations Efkh^ABk2g and
Efk~hAEwk2g, we can further express SNRE as in (12) at
the top of the next page.
From (11) and (12), we expect that Eve can simultaneously
eavesdrop the transmitted messages and destroy the legitimate
communication link if the pilot contamination power PEp is
sufficiently high.
A. Optimizing Energy Allocation
In the following, we further discuss an efficient use of the
transmission energy of the full-duplex eavesdropper. From the
4SNRB =
2PAPBABBANA
PAAB2w(PEpEA + 2A) + (PEdEB + 2B)(PBBA + PEpEA + 2A)
: (11)
SNRE =
2PAPEpAEEANA
PAAE2w(PBBA + 2A) + 2E(PBBA + PEpEA + 2A)
: (12)
viewpoint of the active eavesdropper design, it is desirable to
optimally allocate the available energy budget in attacking the
legitimate user’s communication, so that the eavesdropper can
enjoy a satisfactory detection performance while the legitimate
receiver’s detection is severely degraded. We assume that Eve
has a total energy budget for each transmission block, given by
EE , which is allocated among pilot contamination (during the
reverse training phase) and jamming (during the data transmis-
sion phase). In other words, we have PEp+PEd(L 1) = EE .
Note that this energy constraint can also be interpreted as an
average power constraint given by EE=L. Denote the ratio of
total energy allocated to pilot contamination as , we have the
following relationships:
PEp = EE ; PEd = (1  )EE
L  1 : (13)
We consider the scenario that Eve’s primary design objec-
tive is to meet a target SNRE which gives a satisfactory
eavesdropping performance. On top of that, Eve also tries to
minimize SNRB to degrade Bob’s detection performance. The
optimization problem can then be formulated as
argmin

SNRB ; s.t. SNRE  ; (14)
where  denotes the minimum required value of SNRE .
Note that the constraint of SNRE   may not be satisfied
if  is too large. Since  2 [0; 1], the maximum feasible value
of SNRE is reached by setting  = 1, which should not be
smaller than . Hence, solving SNRE =  with  = 1 gives
the maximum feasible value of  as
max =
2PAAEEANAEE
(PBBA + 2A)(PAAE2w + 2E) + EA2EEE
: (15)
Clearly if Eve has a larger energy budget, a higher max
is feasible. Nevertheless, max is bounded from above by
2PAAENA=2E as EE !1.
Assuming   max, we can find the feasible range of 
that satisfies SNRE   as  2 [min; 1] where
min =
(PBBA + 2A)(PAAE2w + 2E)
(2PAAEEANA   EA2E)EE
: (16)
That is to say, any choice of  2 [min; 1] will give Eve the
required eavesdropping performance.
Next, Eve chooses the optimal  from [min; 1] to minimize
SNRB by solving argmax SNR 1B . Substituting (13) into
(11), it can be shown that SNR 1B is concave in . Hence,
the optimal energy allocation strategy is obtained by letting
the first derivative of SNR 1B w.r.t. be zero and the solution
is given by
 =
8<:
1; if EE < ,
min; if EE+2EE < min,EE+
2EE ; otherwise,
(17)
where
 =
ABEAPA(L 1)2w+EA(L 1)2B EB2A BAEBPB
EAEB
:
(18)
Note that the solution in (17) requires the knowledge of the
system parameters, such as the transmit powers, the path loss
attenuations and the receiver noise variances, which are usually
assumed to be known by the eavesdropper in the literature of
physical layer security. By knowing the locations of Alice and
Bob, and the path loss exponent of the wireless channel, the
transmit powers from Alice and Bob, as well as the path loss
attenuations between the three terminals can be obtained by
Eve through measurements. In case Eve does not know the
receiver noise variances at Alice and Bob, she may choose to
ignore the receiver noise, which gives a reasonably accurate
approximation in the moderate to high SNR regime.
Remark: When Eve is located much closer to Alice than to
Bob, we have EA=EB  1. In this scenario, one may expect
that Eve should choose  = 1, i.e., allocating all the energy
to pilot contamination, since the received pilot contamination
signal at Alice would be much stronger compared to the
received jamming signal at Bob. From the optimal solution
in (17), we know that  = 1 requires EE  . From
(18), we have   (L   1)(ABPA2w + 2B)=EB which
is independent of the ratio of EA=EB . Therefore, as long
as Eve’s energy budget is above (the finite value of) , it is
never optimal to concentrate all energy to pilot contamination
even if EA=EB !1. A similar result can be found for the
opposite case where Eve is located much closer to Bob than
to Alice. Hence, we conclude that it is always wise for Eve to
transmit in both phases when she has a good energy budget
at hand.
B. Half-Duplex Eavesdropper
In what follows, we briefly discuss the case of a half-duplex
eavesdropper, which is indeed a special scenario of the full-
duplex case.
Pure Pilot Contamination: In this case, Eve performs the
pilot contamination attack during the reverse training phase
and acts as a receiver during the data transmission phase.
This is the special case of PEd = 0 or  = 1 in previous
subsections. To achieve a target minimum value of SNRE
given by , the minimum required pilot contamination power
is found as
PEp;min = (PBBA + 
2
A)(PAAE2w + 2E)
2PAAEEANA   EA2E
: (19)
Pure Jamming: When Eve is not able to achieve a sat-
isfactory data detection performance, she can choose to act
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Fig. 2. The average post-processing SNR at Bob or Eve versus the average
transmit power at Eve. The required minimum SNRE is set to 10 dB. The solid
lines show SNRB and SNRE achieved with the optimal energy allocation
 given in (17). The dashed lines show SNRB and SNRE achieved with
min given in (16). The other system parameters are: NA = 4, L = 10,
PA = PB = 10 dB, 2A = 2B = 2E = 2w = 1, AB = BA = AE =
EA = EB = 1.
as a pure jammer and aim to minimize SNRB by optimally
allocating her energy among the reverse training phase and
the data transmission phase. The knowledge of the pilots is
not required and random noise can be used in this case. The
optimal value of  is given by
 =
8<:
1; if EE < ,
0; if EE <  ,
EE+
2EE ; otherwise,
(20)
which is obtained by letting min = 0 in (17) and  is given
in (18).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Now, we present numerical results to illustrate the benefits
obtained by Eve from the pilot contamination attack. Fig. 2
shows the average post-processing SNRs at Bob and Eve,
i.e., SNRB and SNRE , during data transmission. The full-
duplex mode is considered in which Eve uses different power
levels for pilot contamination and jamming. The primary goal
of Eve is to meet a minimum SNRE of 10 dB. Results are
shown for Eve’s average power budget EE=L ranging from
5 dB to 15 dB. We see that Eve is able to simultaneously
achieve the required SNR for herself and make Bob suffer
from a relatively low SNR. The values of SNRB and SNRE
strongly depend on the energy allocation parameter . We
include the SNR results for the case of minimum pilot con-
tamination energy allocation, i.e.,min in (16), and the case of
optimal energy allocation, i.e., in (17). It is clear from Fig. 2
that the optimal energy allocation not only reduces SNRB but
also achieves a better SNRE compared to the case of using
minimum energy for pilot contamination.
V. ATTACK DETECTION AND COUNTERMEASURES
In this work, we showed the detrimental effect of the
pilot contamination attack on the secrecy performance. It is
therefore important for the legitimate user to detect such
an attack and design countermeasures. The detection of the
pilot contamination attack may be achieved by transmitting a
sufficiently long pilot sequence in the reverse training phase
and analyzing the variance of the received signal at Alice
after normalizing it by the pilot sequence. If the variance is
close to that of the receiver noise, it indicates that the pilot
contamination attack may have been used by Eve. In order
to make this attack ineffective, blind channel estimation can
be used by Alice based on the data transmission from Bob,
assuming two-way communications.
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